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2009 Tabor Lecture 
BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS: 
ETHICAL DILEMMAS OF CORPORATE 
COUNSEL IN THE WORLD OF THE HOLDER 
MEMORANDUM 
John Hasnas* 
In Homer’s Odyssey, the Strait of Messina is beset by two fearsome 
sea monsters.  On one side resides Scylla, a creature with twelve feet and 
six heads on long, snaky necks, each possessing three rows of razor 
sharp teeth, who devours whatever comes within her reach.  A bowshot 
away on the other side, resides Charybdis, a creature who drinks down 
and belches forth the waters of the strait three times a day, creating 
whirlpools that are fatal to shipping.  On his voyage home, Odysseus 
attempts to sail through the narrow strait, avoiding both the slavering 
jaws of Scylla and the whirlpools of Charybdis. He is unable to do so 
successfully. 
This Lecture suggests that in the contemporary legal environment, 
corporate counsel as well as outside counsel who represent corporations1 
frequently find themselves in a situation analogous to that of Odysseus.  
The legal standard of corporate criminal liability coupled with current 
federal law enforcement policy can force attorneys who represent 
corporations to sail a vanishingly narrow strait between their 
professional obligation to represent their clients zealously within the 
bounds of the law and their personal moral obligations to deal with 
corporate employees honestly and justly. 
Professional ethics concerns both the ethical obligations of individual 
actors within a system and the ethical quality of the system as a whole.  
                                                 
* Associate Professor, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University; J.D. & 
Ph.D. in Philosophy, Duke University; LL.M in Legal Education, Temple University.  The 
Author wishes to thank the members of the Tabor Institute on Legal Ethics and the faculty 
at the Valparaiso University School of Law for the opportunity to present the 2009 Bench 
and Bar Lecture.  The Author also wishes to thank Ann C. Tunstall of SciLucent, LLC, for 
her insightful comments on a draft of this Lecture, and Annette and Ava Hasnas of the 
Montessori School of Northern Virginia for providing him with first-hand experience of 
what it means to be between Scylla and Charybdis. 
1 For purposes of concision and convenience, I will employ the term “corporation” to 
refer not merely to businesses that have gone through the formal process of incorporation, 
but to business organizations generally, regardless of their legal form.  My remarks apply 
to counsel representing partnerships and other unincorporated business organizations as 
well as those representing corporations. 
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When the focus is on the behavior of individual professionals, the 
inquiry addresses questions such as:  What obligations do individual 
attorneys, physicians, clergymen, accountants, etc. take on when they 
assume their professional roles?  What are and how do we determine the 
contours of these obligations?  How can we demonstrate that they are 
genuine ethical obligations?  When the focus is on the functioning of the 
system as a whole, however, the inquiry addresses questions such as: If 
all of the individual actors meet their professional obligations, will the 
result be good for society as a whole?  Does the system function in a way 
that works an injustice or unreasonable hardship on any individuals or 
on particular segments of the community? 
The questions associated with these two lines of inquiry are distinct, 
but related.  If the system is ethically well-grounded, the individual 
professionals can feel confident that they are “doing the right thing” in a 
larger, societal sense by fulfilling their professional obligations under 
their profession’s codes of ethics.  On the other hand, if there are 
questions about the ethical quality of the system as a whole, individual 
professionals will be able to repose less trust in their profession’s codes 
of ethics and will be more open to doubt about whether to adhere to 
their professional obligations in difficult cases. 
An ideal system is one in which the collective goals of the system 
and the obligations and incentives of the individual professionals are 
aligned.  Such a system is one in which individual professionals advance 
the well-being of society by meeting their professional obligations.  
Unfortunately, in the context of corporate criminal responsibility, the 
overarching goals of our adversarial system of justice and the obligations 
of individual attorneys under the Canon of Ethics are not well-aligned.  
This misalignment stands in sharp contrast to the situation that 
ordinarily obtains.  For, when attorneys represent individual clients, the 
goals of our system of justice and the professional obligations of 
individual attorneys are mutually reinforcing. 
Under the Canon of Ethics, attorneys assume a fiduciary obligation 
to their clients.  They undertake to keep their clients’ communications 
confidential2 and to zealously represent their clients’ interests3 to the 
exclusion of the interests of both other individuals and society as a 
whole.  Attorneys may depart from this fiduciary relationship only in a 
small and definitely identified class of exceptional cases. 
It is easy to explain why individual attorneys are ethically bound to 
act in accordance with these undertakings.  The duty arises from each 
attorney’s own freely given promise coupled with the basic ethical 
                                                 
2 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1983). 
3 Id. at 7-1. 
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obligation to keep one’s word.  Clients are willing to confide in their 
attorneys and to pay them for their services because attorneys promise 
confidentiality and fiduciary representation.  For an attorney to make 
such a promise, obtain information on the basis of the client’s reliance 
upon it, and then use the information to serve any interest other than the 
client’s would be the ethical equivalent of fraud. 
Does requiring attorneys to maintain the obligations of 
confidentiality and exclusive representation serve the interests of the 
larger society as well?  In an adversarial system of justice, when the 
client is an individual, the answer is yes. 
Law is concerned with interpersonal human conflict.  Human beings 
have both limited knowledge and limited ability to distance themselves 
from their own goals.  Hence, we are aware that we do not have access to 
objective truth.  As illustrated by the famous Akira Kurosawa movie, 
Rashomon,4 we know that our perceptions of reality are affected by our 
interests.  The foundation of the adversarial system of justice is the belief 
that letting each party tell his or her story to an impartial decision-maker 
will get as close to the truth as is humanly possible.  This belief is 
justified, however, only if all parties are able to tell their story effectively.  
This, in turn, implies that for the system to work, all parties to a legal 
dispute need access to a skilled advocate who can make sure that their 
side of the story is adequately presented.  For such an advocate to be able 
to perform his or her function effectively, the advocate needs the client’s 
full confidence—the client’s willingness to relate all the details of the 
case no matter how unfavorable, embarrassing, or threatening to the 
client’s future interests they may be.  Only one who undertakes a 
fiduciary obligation to the client and guarantees to preserve the client’s 
confidential communications can generate this level of confidence.  Thus, 
supplying each potential litigant with an expert representative who has 
undertaken the obligations described in the Canon is necessary to make 
the system function as designed. 
The idea underlying an adversarial system of justice is that 
individuals pursuing their own interests within a properly structured 
system will produce the optimal outcome for society.  The clash of well-
represented opposing parties will burn away falsehood and biased 
judgment to reveal the truth and produce a just result.  This is an 
invisible-hand mechanism.  When the system properly aligns the 
incentives of the litigants with the goals of justice, the individual 
litigants, each thinking only of his or her own advantage, are led as if by 
an invisible hand to produce just outcomes. 
                                                 
4 For those of us who do not like reading subtitles, the Hollywood-Paul Newman 
version of the film, THE OUTRAGE (MGM (Warner) 1964), will do. 
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The invisible hand is usually associated with Adam Smith’s 
description of a market in The Wealth of Nations.5  Smith argued that 
when individuals pursue self-interest within the incentives of a free, 
competitive market, the common good is more effectively achieved than 
it would be if each actor was striving to realize it him- or herself.  The 
reason for this is that the combination of the limitations on human 
knowledge that make it impossible for us to take all consequences of our 
actions into account and our ineradicable prejudices and partiality make 
it difficult to achieve the common good directly.  Precisely the same type 
of argument undergirds our system of justice.  The limitations on human 
beings’ knowledge and impartiality means that we are more likely to 
produce justice when we do not aim at it directly, but allow it to emerge 
from a process that tends to cancel out errors and prejudices. 
There are many grounds on which this argument for the adversarial 
system may be criticized.  Evaluating such criticisms would take us well 
beyond the scope of this Lecture, however.  For present purposes, I will 
simply assert that, by and large, I believe the argument to be a good one, 
and hence, I am supportive of an adversarial system of justice.  Within 
such a system, attorneys can feel confident that by adhering to their 
professional obligations to their clients, they are also benefitting society 
as a whole.  And the importance of this confidence cannot be gainsaid.  
For, it is crucially necessary to help attorneys weather the criticism and 
scorn they receive when they represent unpopular clients. 
My confidence that there is a proper alignment between the goal of 
justice and the professional obligations of attorneys is limited to those 
                                                 
5 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 356 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Liberty Classics 1981).  Smith states: 
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to 
employ his capital in the support of domestick industry, and so to 
direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every 
individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the 
society as great as he can.  He generally, indeed, neither intends to 
promote the publick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.  
By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign industry, he 
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his 
own  gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.  Nor is it 
always the worse for the society that it was no part of it.  By pursuing 
his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.  I have never 
known much good done by those who affected to trade for the publick 
good.  It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, 
and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it. 
Id. 
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cases in which the client is an individual, however. I am much less 
sanguine about the situation when the client is a corporate entity.  Under 
present federal criminal law and law enforcement policy, an attorney 
representing a corporation has reason to doubt whether the zealous 
representation of his or her client really serves the ends of justice—
whether he or she is doing the right thing by adhering to his or her 
professional obligation.  This doubt does not arise from any flaw 
inherent in the adversarial system of justice, but from perverse incentives 
introduced into the justice system by a misguided Supreme Court 
decision and the actions of our present Attorney General during his 
previous tenure with the Department of Justice. 
The misguided Supreme Court decision is the 1909 case of New York 
Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States.6  In that case, the Court 
held that corporations could be criminally convicted for the crimes of 
their employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability.  This 
means that a corporation is guilty of the crimes committed by any of its 
employees acting within the scope of their employment for the benefit of 
the corporation. 
Why do I call this decision misguided?  Consider the following.  If 
corporate employees violate the criminal law while working within the 
scope of their employment, they may be prosecuted as individuals.  This 
is perfectly sensible.  Working within a corporation does not insulate one 
from the consequences of his or her wrongdoing.  Under New York 
Central, if corporate employees violate the criminal law while working 
within the scope of their employment, their corporation may be 
prosecuted as well.  Why? 
The justification for respondeat superior liability in tort is not 
available.  Employees are often judgment-proof, and hence cannot be 
deterred from engaging in risky activity that they believe will earn them 
rewards from their employer by the threat of civil liability.  Respondeat 
superior tort liability creates an incentive for employers to deter such 
conduct by their employees.  But this justification does not apply in the 
criminal context because no employee is criminally “judgment-proof.”  
All are subject to the threat of criminal punishment for criminal activity.  
Further, in New York Central, the Court itself recognized that the 
justification for respondeat superior tort liability is the need to do 
corrective justice.  The Court stated that such liability  
is not imputed because the principal actually 
participates in the malice or fraud, but because the act is 
done for the benefit of the principal, while the agent is 
                                                 
6 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
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acting within the scope of his employment in the 
business of the principal, and “justice requires that the 
latter shall be held responsible for damages to the individual 
who has suffered by such conduct.”7 
Indeed, it is a commonplace in tort that corrective justice may require 
one who is without personal fault but who has caused or benefitted from 
an injury to an innocent party to pay compensation to restore the injured 
party to his or her previous condition.  But this is irrelevant to criminal 
liability in which corrective justice is not at issue.  What is needed in the 
context of the criminal law is a justification for punishment, not 
restitution. 
Ethicists often grapple with the question of whether corporations as 
opposed to individuals can be held morally responsible for actions.  
Many argue that they cannot.8  Some argue that they can.9  Among the 
latter, some argue that corporations are morally responsible for 
corporate policy—for the output of the corporation’s internal decision 
structure.10  Others contend that corporations are morally responsible for 
the actions of their employees when they maintain a corporate culture 
that encourages wrongdoing.11  But none have argued that corporations 
are morally responsible for the crimes of their employees when they 
have done everything in their power to prevent such wrongdoing and 
maintain an ethical corporate culture. 
                                                 
7 Id. at 493 (emphasis added). 
8 See, e.g., JOHN R. DANLEY, Corporate Moral Agency:  The Case for Anthropological Bigotry, 
in BUSINESS ETHICS 202 (W. Michael Hoffman & Jennifer Mills Moore eds., 2d ed. 1990); 
JOHN LADD, Persons and Responsibility:  Ethical Concepts and Impertinent Analyses, in SHAME, 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE CORPORATION 77 (Hugh Curtler ed., 1986); Michael Keely, 
Organizations as Non-persons, 15 J. VALUE INQUIRY 149 (1979); Larry May, Vicarious Agency 
and Corporate Responsibility, 43 PHIL. STUD. 69 (1983); Manuel Velasquez, Debunking 
Corporate Moral Responsibility, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 531 (2003). 
9 See THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 30 (Prentice-Hall 1982); 
PATRICIA H. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONS 59 (Prentice-Hall 1985); 
Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 211 (1979); Michael J. 
Phillips, Corporate Moral Personhood and Three Conceptions of the Corporation, 2 BUS. ETHICS Q. 
435, 453 (1992)..  See also David T. Ozar, The Moral Responsibility of Corporations, in ETHICAL 
ISSUES IN BUSINESS:  A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 294 (Thomas Donaldson & Patricia 
Werhane eds., 1979); Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John B. Mathews, Jr., Can a Corporation Have 
a Conscience? 60 HARV. BUS. REV. 132, 135 (1982); Robert J. Rafalko, Corporate Punishment:  A 
Proposal, 8 J. BUS. ETHICS 917, 924 (1989). 
10 See French, supra note 9, at 211. 
11 See, e.g., Pamela Bucy, Corporate Ethos:  A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1103–05 (1991); Ann Foerschler, Corporate Criminal Intent:  
Toward a Better Understanding of Corporate Misconduct, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1287–88 (1990); 
Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 
743, 767–73 (1992). 
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Yet, the respondeat superior liability authorized by New York Central 
holds corporations criminally liable for the actions of their employees 
taken within the scope of their employment no matter what.  Under New 
York Central, the corporation is liable even if the employee’s conduct is 
against corporate policy and contravenes the employee’s explicit 
instructions.12  Under New York Central, the corporation is liable even if 
the corporation has the most pristine corporate culture and has 
undertaken the most vigorous efforts to prevent employee wrongdoing.  
Under New York Central, the corporation is strictly liable for the crimes of 
its employees. 
But New York Central is not misguided merely as a matter of moral 
responsibility.  The decision also cannot be justified as a matter of 
criminal responsibility.  The purpose of the criminal law is punishment. 
But vicarious corporate criminal liability serves none of the purposes of 
punishment. 
To see why, please note that corporations are subject only to 
financial sanctions. Because corporations have no bodies, they cannot be 
incarcerated.  They may be fined, which constitutes the direct application 
of a financial penalty.  They may have licenses revoked or otherwise 
have their freedom to transact business restricted, but such measures 
merely constitute the indirect application of a financial penalty—they are 
punitive only to the extent that they reduce the corporation’s 
profitability.  They may be liquidated, which can be thought of as a 
corporate death sentence.  But because corporations are not literally 
living things, any “execution” is entirely metaphorical.  Liquidation is to 
be feared only because of the financial losses that result from it. 
Who pays when a financial loss is imposed upon a corporation?  To 
the extent that such a loss cannot be passed along to consumers, it is the 
owners of the corporation, the shareholders, who incur the penalty.  The 
defining characteristic of modern corporation is the separation of 
ownership and control.  The shareholders, who own the corporation, 
have no direct control over or knowledge of the behavior of the 
corporate employees who commit criminal offenses.  Hence, inflicting 
punishment on a corporation’s shareholders is punishing those who are 
personally innocent of wrongdoing for the offenses of others.13  How can 
                                                 
12 New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909); 
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972). 
13 My arguments are intended to apply to business organizations generally, not merely 
to those that have undergone the formal process of incorporation.  Hence, with regard to 
incorporated business organizations, this point must be adapted to the relevant 
organizational form.  For example, in the case of limited partnerships, the issue would 
concern punishing the firm’s innocent limited partners rather than innocent shareholders.  
In this regard, it must be admitted that in those business organizations in which there is 
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punishing the innocent advance any of the legitimate purposes of 
punishment? 
It cannot.  Consider retribution first.  Retribution justifies imposing 
sanctions only on those who have acted in a blameworthy way.  
Retribution clearly justifies punishing corporate employees who commit 
a criminal offense.  It cannot justify punishing corporate shareholders 
who are innocent of personal wrongdoing.  A criminal justice system 
based exclusively on a retributivist theory of punishment would 
expressly exclude such vicarious criminal liability. 
What about deterrence?  All but the staunchest retributivists would 
argue that a major purpose of criminal punishment is to deter 
wrongdoing.  But not by any means.  Specifically, not by punishing the 
innocent.  In the Anglo-American criminal justice system, deterrence 
refers to inflicting punishment on a wrongdoer to discourage others from 
committing similar offenses.  It does not refer to punishing the innocent 
to pressure them into suppressing the criminal activity of their fellow 
citizens. 
There is a sense in which threatening to inflict punishment on a 
corporation’s innocent owners for the crimes of the corporation’s 
employees can be said to deter crime.  Fear of the financial penalty to be 
visited on the corporation can motivate management to attempt to 
suppress criminal activity by corporate employees.  But this form of 
deterrence is no different in principle from more venial and obviously 
unacceptable forms of punishment.  Much of the crime attributable to 
teenagers could undoubtedly be deterred by punishing parents for their 
children’s offenses.  The Nazis sought to deter acts of resistance by 
punishing innocent members of the communities in which such acts 
occurred.  Although such measures may be effective, they generally are 
not and should not be permitted in a liberal criminal justice system.  
Threatening innocent shareholders with punishment for the offenses of 
culpable corporate employees may be an effective means of reducing 
criminal activity within business organizations, but it does not constitute 
the type of deterrence that can justify criminal punishment in a liberal 
legal regime. 
Punishment is sometimes justified on the basis of its rehabilitative 
effect.  But rehabilitation refers to imposing treatment on a wrongdoer 
designed to reform his or her character to ensure better behavior in the 
future.  One cannot rehabilitate the innocent.  Threatening those who 
                                                                                                             
true shared control among all parties—e.g., certain general partnerships—there may be no 
question of punishing the innocent because all parties are personally culpable.  However, 
in such cases, punishing the firm as a corporate entity would be pointless because all 
members of the firm would be subject to conviction as individuals. 
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have not engaged in wrongful conduct with punishment in order to 
make them “behave better” is not rehabilitation.  It is coercing them to 
act in the way that the coercive agent believes that they should.  
“Rehabilitating” the innocent is simply depriving them of their liberty. 
There is no doubt that the threat of corporate criminal liability can 
influence managers to adopt legal compliance programs and to 
otherwise try to produce a corporate environment that discourages 
criminal activity by its employees.  But such governmental action is not 
rehabilitation, and as a matter of principle, it is not distinct from the 
practices of the old Soviet Union and Mao’s China in which those whose 
conduct was unacceptable to the government were sent to psychiatric 
hospitals and “re-education” camps.  Threatening innocent shareholders 
with punishment for the offenses of culpable corporate employees may 
be an effective means of producing a general improvement in “corporate 
culture,” but it is not a form of rehabilitation that can justify criminal 
punishment in a liberal legal regime. 
Now, consider the practical effect of the New York Central standard of 
corporate criminal liability.  Under New York Central’s respondeat 
superior liability, there is nothing a corporation can do to ensure that it is 
not guilty of a criminal offense.  Corporate counsel know that no matter 
how good their firm’s internal controls, they cannot guarantee either that 
there will be no intentional violations of law by rogue employees or that, 
in today’s highly-regulated business environment where many offenses 
do not require intentional conduct, there will be no inadvertent 
violations of law.  Corporate counsel also know that because under the 
New York Central standard the corporation’s good behavior is no defense, 
the corporation can be convicted whenever such violations occur.  
Further, as illustrated by the fate of Arthur Andersen, criminal 
indictment can be a corporate death sentence.  Any company dependent 
upon its reputation for honest dealing or government contracting from 
which it can be debarred must avoid indictment at all costs.  Therefore, 
the financial health and frequently the continued existence of the 
corporation can rest on whether the corporation is indicted. 
This brings us to the second element of the problem—the policy of 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) governing the criminal indictment of 
corporations.  This policy is contained in a memorandum originally 
drafted by Attorney General Eric Holder when he was Deputy Attorney 
General during the Clinton Administration.14  It has been revised and 
                                                 
14 See Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr., to Heads of Dep’t 
Components & United States Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(June 16, 1999). 
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reissued several times being called respectively, the Holder, Thompson,15 
McNulty,16 and Filip Memorandum.17  Now that Attorney General 
Holder has returned to the DOJ, I will refer to the memorandum by its 
original designation as the Holder Memorandum.  The Holder 
Memorandum lists the factors prosecutors are instructed to consider in 
deciding whether to indict a corporation.  These factors include whether 
the corporation has an effective compliance program18 and whether the 
corporation cooperates with the investigation of its employees’ 
wrongdoing.19 
What makes a compliance program an effective one?  It must be 
“adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in preventing and 
detecting wrongdoing by employees,” a characteristic that depends in 
part on seriousness of the program’s “disciplinary action against past 
violators” and the “promptness of any disclosure of wrongdoing to the 
government.”20 
What constitutes cooperation?  As recently as three years ago, 
cooperation was defined in terms of “the corporation’s willingness to 
identify the culprits within the corporation, including senior executives; 
to make witnesses available; to disclose the complete results of its 
internal investigation; and to waive attorney-client and work product 
protection,”21 and its refusal to support employees under investigation 
“either through the advancing of attorneys fees, through retaining the 
employees without sanction for their misconduct, or through providing 
information to the employees about the government’s investigation 
                                                 
15 Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Larry Thompson, to Heads of Dep’t 
Components & United States Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(Jan. 20, 2003) [herein after Thompson Memo]. 
16 Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Paul J. McNulty, to Heads of Dep’t 
Components & United .States Att’ys Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(Dec. 16, 2006) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo. 
pdf. 
17 Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Mark R. Filip, to Heads of Dep’t Components 
& United States Att’ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 
2008) available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf 
[hereinafter Filip Memo]. 
18 The memorandum instructs prosecutors to consider “the existence and effectiveness 
of the corporation’s pre-existing compliance program” and “the corporation’s remedial 
actions, including any efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance program or 
to improve an existing one[.]” Id. at 4. 
19 The Memorandum instructs prosecutors to consider “the corporation’s timely and 
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of 
its agents,” and “to replace responsible management, to discipline or terminate 
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies.”  
Id. 
20 Id.  at 15. 
21 Thompson Memo, supra note 15, at 5. 
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pursuant to a joint defense agreement.”22  However, due to the uproar 
over forced waivers of attorney-client and work product privilege and a 
finding that coercing a corporation into refusing to pay its employees’ 
attorney’s fees constituted a violation of the Sixth Amendment,23 the DOJ 
now defines cooperation as “the corporation’s willingness to provide 
relevant information and evidence and identify relevant actors within 
and outside the corporation, including senior executives.”24  This 
includes turning over the factual results of all internal investigations and 
a refusal to aid suspected employees in mounting a defense. 
The effect of the New York Central standard of corporate liability 
coupled with incentives in the Holder Memorandum is to place 
corporations and their employees in an adversarial relationship.  As 
should be apparent from the way the DOJ defines compliance programs 
and cooperation, the only way for a corporation to reduce its prospects 
of being indicted when an employee comes under investigation for 
possible criminal activity is to sign on as a deputy prosecutorial agent.  
This state of affairs creates a considerable divergence between what is 
good for the corporation and what is good for its employees. 
Let’s consider several examples, beginning with the question of 
employee privacy.  Do employees have any right to privacy in the 
workplace?  They certainly do not possess anything like the right to 
privacy they have in their own homes.  Employers are entitled to 
monitor employees’ conduct in the workplace to ensure they are capable 
of doing their jobs and are in fact doing them.  It is reasonable to believe 
that employees waive their right to privacy with regard to employment-
related matters when they enter into the employment relationship.  
However, merely accepting employment does not give employers carte 
blanche to investigate non-job-related aspects of their employees’ lives.  
Doing so not only violates employees’ residual right to privacy, but, to 
the extent that the employees are aware that their activities may be 
monitored at all times, creates an oppressive working environment. 
To reduce its chances of being indicted should employees come 
under investigation, a corporation must have an effective compliance 
program that is “adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in 
preventing and detecting wrongdoing by employees . . . .”25  Yet, white 
collar crime almost always consists of crimes of deception.  Such crimes 
are necessarily designed to be indistinguishable from legal behavior.  
What level of monitoring would be required for the corporation’s 
                                                 
22 Id. at 6 (footnote omitted). 
23 See United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
24 Filip Memo, supra note 17, at 7. 
25 Id. at 15. 
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compliance program to be maximally effective in preventing and 
detecting such disguised wrongdoing?  By necessity, the level of 
monitoring would have to be more intrusive than that required merely 
to monitor job performance.  How much more intrusive?  There is no 
clear answer to this question, but recent developments may provide 
some insight.  For example, Deloitte and Touche LLP markets a service 
preparing psychological profiles of employees to aid corporations in 
detecting those more likely to commit fraud,26 and Wal-Mart has hired 
former FBI, CIA, and DOJ officials to conduct internal investigations of 
its employees.27  Such developments suggest that meeting the DOJ’s 
definition of an effective compliance program is largely incompatible 
with maintaining proper respect for employees’ right to privacy. 
Next, consider the question of confidentiality.  To run an ethical 
business, mangers have to know what is going on in the firm.  Most 
businesses attempt to acquire information of potential wrongdoing by 
promising employees who come forward confidentiality.  Such promises 
of confidentiality usually come in one of two forms.  First, corporations 
create confidential lines of communication that circumvent the ordinary 
corporate chain of command, such as employee hotlines or 
organizational ombudsmen.  Second, corporations encourage their 
employees to provide information to corporate counsel under the 
protection of the attorney-client privilege.  But what happens when these 
confidential channels generate information that suggests possible 
criminal activity within the firm?  In order to reduce its risk of corporate 
indictment, the corporation must cooperate with government 
investigations.  Cooperation requires the corporation to provide the 
government with “the facts known to the corporation about the putative 
criminal misconduct under review.”28  Although since 2008, the DOJ will 
no longer request waiver of attorney-client or work-product privilege,29 
it still requires corporations to disclose the facts generated by the 
corporation’s internal investigations, whether made to corporate counsel, 
employee hotline, or corporate ombudsman.  As a result, the corporation 
must choose between protecting itself against indictment and honoring 
its promise of confidentiality. 
One might assume that an ethical corporation can avoid this 
dilemma by refusing to make promises of confidentiality that it knows it 
                                                 
26 See Karen Richardson, Find the Bad Employee:  A Tool Can Do It, Privacy Issues Aside, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2006, at C3. 
27 See Michael Barbaro, Bare-Knuckle Enforcement for Wal-Mart’s Rules, N.Y. TIMES, March 
29, 2007, at A1. 
28 Filip Memo, supra note 17, at 9. 
29 Id. 
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will later have to breach.  But that will not work.  The maintenance of a 
confidential mechanism for reporting possible criminal conduct is the 
hallmark of an effective compliance program.30  Failure to promise 
confidentiality essentially guarantees that a corporation’s compliance 
program will not be considered an effective one.  Hence, corporations 
have the strongest possible incentives to both make and breach promises 
of confidentiality. 
Now consider the question of organizational justice. Do corporations 
have any ethical obligations to support their employees who come under 
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing?  Perhaps not, if they know that their 
employees knowingly and intentionally violated the law.  But what if the 
corporation does not know this?  Don’t loyal employees who come 
under suspicion have some claim to fair treatment by their employer?  
Aren’t they entitled to a minimal presumption of innocence in the sense 
that no adverse action be taken against them in the absence of adequate 
evidence of wrongdoing?  But to be considered cooperative by the DOJ, 
corporations must essentially sign on as deputy prosecutors.  Helping 
those employees, who the DOJ considers culpable, to mount a defense; 
refusing to sanction employees who elect not to speak to prosecutors; 
providing employees with information about what the government is 
investigating; and entering into joint defense agreements with employees 
that may disable the corporation from “providing some relevant facts to 
the government”31 may all be regarded by the DOJ as “limiting [the 
corporation’s] ability to seek . . . cooperation credit.”32  How can 
managers afford their employees even a modicum of due process while 
threatening them with termination if they refuse to cooperate with 
prosecutors and doing everything in their power to aid in their 
prosecution?  Given the DOJ’s definition of cooperation, corporations’ 
best chances of avoiding indictment directly conflict with any duty they 
may have to protect their employees against potentially ungrounded 
criminal accusations. 
The poster child for this problem is the recent KPMG LLP case.  
Between 1996 and 2003, KPMG marketed several tax shelters designed to 
allow wealthy investors to avoid federal taxes.  In July, 2001, the Internal 
Revenue Service “listed” two of these tax shelters, putting taxpayers on 
notice that the IRS considers them suspect and subject to challenge in tax 
                                                 
30 Indeed, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress required publicly traded companies to 
establish procedures for “the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the 
issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.”  Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (2002) (emphasis added). 
31 Filip Memo, supra note 17, at 13. 
32 Id. 
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court.  The IRS did not, in fact, challenge any of KPMG’s shelters in 
court.  Hence, whether the shelters are legal or not has never been 
officially determined.  In 2003, Congress began an investigation of 
potentially abusive tax shelters including those marketed by KPMG.  
KPMG defended the marketing of its shelters before Congress, sending 
one of its partners to testify as to their legality.  Subsequently, the DOJ 
opened a criminal investigation into KPMG’s marketing of the shelters. 
In response to the DOJ investigation, KPMG took the following 
measures.  It agreed not to assert any legal privilege including its 
attorney-client and work product privileges and to disclose all 
information in its possession regarding the actions of its present and 
former partners, agents, and employees that the government deemed 
relevant.  It agreed to identify any witnesses that may have information 
relevant to the investigation and to use its best efforts to induce its 
present and former partners and employees to provide information and 
testimony to the government.  It refused to advance the legal fees of any 
partner or employee who refused to cooperate with federal 
investigators.33  It refused to enter into any joint defense agreements with 
any of its present or former partners or employees.  It agreed to inform 
the government which documents its partners and employees were 
requesting to prepare their defenses.  It refused to inform its partners 
and employees of the documents it was supplying to the government to 
aid in their prosecution.  It placed on leave, reassigned, or forced the 
resignation of many of its tax partners.  It officially stated that a number 
of its tax partners engaged in unlawful fraudulent conduct and agreed 
not to make any statement, in litigation or otherwise, that is inconsistent 
with that assertion or to retain any employee who makes such a 
statement.34  And it agreed to pay a $456,000,000 fine.35  KPMG took 
                                                 
33 This was in conformity with the provision in the Thompson Memorandum (the 
predecessor of the McNulty and Filip Memoranda) that permitted prosecutors to consider 
the payment of such fees as a lack of cooperation.  The currently operative Filip 
memorandum does not permit such consideration. 
34 The latter had the practical effect of threatening any KPMG employ who testifies for 
the defendants with termination, significantly undermining the defendants’ ability to 
mount a defense. 
35 The facts of this account of the KPMG case are taken from David N. Kelley, U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Re: 
KPMG) (Aug. 26, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/ 
August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf; Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, KPMG to Pay $456 
Million for Criminal Violations (Aug. 29, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
newsroom/article/0,,id=146999,00.html; Laurie P. Cohen, In the Crossfire:  Prosecutor’s 
Tough New Tactics Turn Firms Against Employees, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2004, at A1; Editorial, 
KPMG in Wonderland, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2005, at A14; Leonard Post, Deferred Prosecution 
Deal Raises Objections, NAT’L. L. J., Jan. 30, 2006 at 4. 
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these measures to avoid the type of federal indictment that destroyed 
Arthur Andersen, LLP.36 
In this context, consider the professional obligations of attorneys 
representing corporate clients.  Corporate counsel have a fiduciary duty 
to their client to zealously pursue its legal interests in preference to all 
others.  But their client is the corporation.  Therefore, they are obligated 
to do what is in the best interest of the corporate entity.  In the context of 
criminal investigations, what is in the best interest of the corporation is, 
to use the current idiom, “to throw the employees under the bus.”  
Lawrence Thompson, who as Deputy Attorney General reissued the 
Holder Memorandum as the Thompson Memorandum, is now general 
counsel of PepsiCo.  In a manner perfectly consistent with his authorship 
of the Thompson Memorandum, Thompson recently stated that to fulfill 
his duty to zealously represent his corporate client when it becomes the 
subject of a federal criminal investigation, his job would be to get the 
government off PepsiCo’s back as quickly and efficiently as possible—
which means cooperating fully with prosecutors as a means to 
terminating the investigation.37 
Now recall the questions that we must ask ourselves to evaluate the 
ethical quality of the adversarial system of justice as a whole.  The first 
was:  If all of the individual actors meet their obligations, will the result 
be good for society as a whole?  In the case of attorneys representing 
corporations, there is no reason to believe this will be the case.  The 
justification for maintaining a fiduciary relationship between attorneys 
and their clients was that in an adversarial system of justice, truth is best 
discovered by sifting the clashing accounts of opposing parties.  But the 
New York Central standard of liability coupled with DOJ enforcement 
policy incentivizes corporations to be deputy prosecutorial agents.  In 
effect, corporations are punished for presenting an account of events at 
odds with the prosecution’s, and rewarded for actions that make it more 
difficult for their individual employees to air their side of the story by 
putting on a defense.  In circumstances in which the best interests of the 
corporation lies in suppressing rather than presenting an adversarial 
                                                 
36 Most of the indictments of KPMG employees were ultimately dismissed as entailing 
violations of the defendants’ Fifth and Sixth Amendments rights.  See United States v. Stein, 
541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).  The Stein decision is chiefly responsible for the DOJ dropping 
the requirements that corporations waive attorney-client privilege and refrain from 
advancing employees’ attorney’s fees to be considered cooperative in the 2006 McNulty 
and 2008 Filip Memoranda. 
37 Lawrence Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at a Round Table Discussion at 
The Heritage Foundation, Following His Address on The Future of the Attorney-Client 
Relationship in White-Collar Prosecutions (Nov. 30, 2006). 
Hasnas: Between Scylla and Charybdis: Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Couns
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
1214 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
viewpoint, the fiduciary relationship to the client does not advance the 
truth-finding and justice-seeking goals of the justice system. 
The second question was:  does the system function in a way that 
works an injustice or unreasonable hardship on any individuals or on 
particular segments of the community?  In the case of attorneys 
representing corporations, there is good reason to believe the answer to 
this question is yes.  If attorneys representing corporations act as 
Lawrence Thompson recommends, there will be considerable injustice 
and hardship on any corporate employee suspected of a crime—think of 
the situation of a potentially innocent employee in KPMG’s tax 
department—and if compliance programs are oppressive enough, 
perhaps on employees in general. 
The answers to these two questions suggest that there is a 
considerable misalignment between the professional obligations of 
attorneys representing corporations and the overarching goals of the 
justice system.  As long as the incentives created by the New York Central 
standard of corporate criminal liability and the Holder Memorandum 
are operating, attorneys representing corporations who act in accordance 
with their professional obligations are not necessarily serving the 
interests of justice.  With these perverse incentives in place, the invisible 
hand built into our system of justice will lead us astray. 
Conversely, when attorneys representing corporations perceive that 
they are not necessarily “doing the right thing” in the larger, societal 
sense by conforming their behavior to their professional standards and 
code of ethics, their commitment to fulfilling their professional 
obligations will wane.  Not all attorneys who represent corporations are 
as sanguine about the actions they are called on to perform as is 
Lawrence Thompson.  Many feel highly conflicted about sacrificing the 
interests of the corporation’s employees to protect the corporate client.  
Corporate counsel frequently describe the personal anguish involved in 
giving the “Upjohn warning.”38  This is the statement they make to 
corporate employees before interviewing them, informing them that 
anything the employees communicate is protected by attorney-client 
privilege, and noting that the client is the corporation.  In giving this 
ethically required warning, corporate counsel know that most employees 
do not understand that they are being told that the corporation will 
reveal whatever the employees communicate whenever it is in the 
corporation’s interest to do so, no matter how damaging it may be to the 
employees.  But to give the employees more than the ethically required 
                                                 
38 The name is derived from the case of Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), in 
which the Supreme Court held that corporations are entitled to the protection of the 
attorney-client privilege. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 [2010], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/7
2010] Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel 1215 
notification—to explain that only the corporation and not the employees is 
protected by the attorney-client privilege—would dry up the sources of 
information corporate counsel need to protect the corporation’s interests.  
And it is the corporation’s interests that corporate counsel are obligated 
to zealously pursue. 
Having identified the problem, I’m afraid I have no solutions to offer 
to attorneys who represent corporations.  The ideal solution would be to 
eliminate vicarious corporate criminal liability. Doing so would instantly 
resolve the misalignment.  However, this would require either a 
Supreme Court decision reversing a century-old precedent that serves as 
the basis of modern corporate criminal law enforcement or an Act of 
Congress that would be publicly perceived as going soft on corporate 
criminals.  Neither of these constitutes a likely scenario.  Another 
solution would be for Attorney General Holder to have an epiphany and 
change DOJ policy on corporate indictment to one focused on a 
corporation’s efforts to maintain an ethical corporate culture rather than 
its efforts to help convict its own employees.  But given that the metric 
by which success is measured at the DOJ is one’s conviction rate, this is 
probably equally unlikely to happen. 
In the absence of such radical reforms, attorneys who represent 
corporations are caught in a difficult situation.  They are bound by their 
oaths to zealously represent their corporate clients.  Yet in doing so, they 
may often be called on to treat the individual employees of the 
corporation unjustly and retard the effectiveness of the adversarial 
system of justice as a whole.  Confronted with the task of navigating 
between violating their professional obligations on the one hand and 
being responsible for the unjust treatment of corporate employees on the 
other, attorneys who represent corporations may be well able to identify 
with Odysseus as he entered the Strait of Messina.  Odysseus was unable 
to navigate the Strait unscathed. Apparently, neither can attorneys 
representing corporations. 
Under such circumstances, what can an ethical attorney do?  I’m 
afraid that I have nothing to offer to such an attorney other than, “the 
best you can.” 
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